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The paper investigates the diplomatic relations of Matthias Corvinus with the 
Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, focusing on the 1460s and ‘70s. It is  trying to 
put new lights on a slightly neglected field of the Corvinian foreign policy, that is, 
Western European contacts. Apart from the sole effort of Jenő Horváth in the 1930s 
there have been no researches looking further behind the traditionally emphasized 
scope of Matthias’ diplomatic activity, that is, the Ottomans and the Habsburgs.2 
I am to introduce a wider span of Matthias’ diplomacy. His concerns were not re-
stricted to Central Europe but he was able to run a leading role in the European 
„grand policie”. The paper explores the political ties with the Duchy of Burgun-
dy, with which Matthias wished to have Hungary involved in the anti-Habsburg, 
anti-Valois and pro-Burgundian „axis” of the contemporary European diplo-
matic system. Matthias’ foreign policy is to be seen within the framework of the 
French-Burgundian antagonism, also in line with his Neapolitan stand: he faced 
the Venice-backed Valois-party, promoting René d’Anjou for the throne of Naples. 
Nevertheless, Matthias’s reason to enter the Burgundian league might have been 
that he hoped to get financial resources for the struggle against the Turks. 
First, I am going to oversee the relationship of Burgundy and Hungary in the 
framework of a parallel power constellation, and give an overview of the parties’ 
common allies and partners within the Holy Roman Empire. Both Burgundy and 
Hungary were seeking for allies within Germany – the houses of Wettin, Wittels-
bach, both its Palatinate and Bavarian branches – against France, Emperor Fred-
erick III and the Jagiellonians, which put them onto the same diplomatic track. 
Matthias was especially aiming to extend the alliance system towards the east-
ern territories of the Empire, and Eastern and North-Eastern Europe. To gain an 
Electoral Principality, Matthias wished to form a united front and have Bohemia 
encircled by allies. 
In 1468-1471 Matthias contracted an alliance with the House of Wettin, Albert 
the Bold [der Beherzte] Duke of Saxony (1464–1500), and Ernest, Elector of Saxony, 
1 The work is supported by the TÁMOP 4.2.1/B-09/1/KONV-2010-0007 project. The 
project is implemented through the New Hungary Development Plan, co-financed by 
the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund.
2 Horváth Jenő, “Mátyás király nyugati diplomáciája,” [Matthias’ Western diplomacy] 
in Mátyás király. Emlékkönyv születésének ötszázéves fordulójára, 2 vols. ed. I. Lukinich, 
Budapest 1940, I: 71–94. 
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Landgrave of Thuringia, Margrave of Meissen (1464–1486).3 He had the scheme on 
the political agenda to marry from the Wettin dynasty, either the daughter of Er-
nest, Duke of Saxony; or his sister. The agreement was that if Duke Albert would 
surrender his claims to the Crown of Bohemia, they put pressure on the Emperor 
to have the King of Hungary acknowledged as King of Bohemia, Matthias would 
acknowledge their rights to their landed properties in Bohemia and Silesia.4 The 
alliance was highly valuable since a few weeks later, in August 1471 Frederick 
III announced that he would not acknowledge Matthias as King of Bohemia, al-
though some weeks before the Pope, Paul II also warned Frederick to acknowl-
edge Matthias’ crown. It was a great achievement to detach Albert of Saxony from 
the Habsburg alliance, since he was related to Frederick III: his mother was Mar-
garet of Austria, sister of Frederick III, Holy Roman Emperor. However, parallelly 
with Matthias’s alliance scheme, Duke Albert also moved towards Burgundy: he 
became a member of the Order of the Golden Fleece. 
In 1472 Matthias, asking aid against Poland, came to an understanding with 
Albert III Achillles, Elector of Brandenburg.5 The parties, together with the dukes 
of Saxony, Ernest and Albert, and their uncle William III the Brave [der Tapfere], 
Landgrave of Thuringia discussed over their disputes at a conference at Zerbst, 
Albert joined the alliance.6 On the intermediation of William of Thuringia, who 
had a claim to the Duchy of Luxemburg, Hungary and Bohemia by right of his 
mother, a grand-daughter of Emperor Sigismund, the parties agreed that the son 
of Albert, John Cicero marries William’s daughter and heir of Luxemburg, Marga-
ret.7 William did not wish to make benefit of his rights. In 1467, when Elisabeth of 
Austria, last rival claimant to the title, renounced her rights, Charles, Duke of Bur-
gundy, assumed the title of duke of Luxemburg. With the intermediation of Mat-
thias, the Landgrave of Thuringia and his Wettin nephews could hope to receive 
Luxemburg from Burgundy; as well as the heiress’ consort, John Cicero could 
hope to get a part of the inheritance in an alliance with Burgundy and Hungary 
versus the Habsburgs. 1473 saw a series of embassies to and from Hungary, Sax-
ony and Brandenburg forging an anti-Habsburg league. Brandenburg allied with 
Corvinus primarily against their common enemy, Poland. It was only after Mat-
thias received a positive answer from the Elector that he assured his backing for 
the Austrian estates discontented with the Emperor (1472)8, and with the support 
of the Imperial allies, he was to reproach Frederick for his Jagiellonian alliance 
3 Mátyás király levelei. Külügyi osztály. 1458–1490. Mathiae Corvini Hungariae regis episto-
lae exterae, ed. V. Fraknói, 2 vols. Budapest 1893–1895 [20082. ed. Gy. Mayer] [hereafter 
MKL] I: nos. 179.; 180–181.; 183.; 236.; 183.; 202.; 204.
4 E. Kovács Péter, Matthias Corvinus. Budapest 1990, 108. 
5 MKL I: nos. 187–188. V. Fraknói, Mátyás király és a Hohenzollernek diplomáciai 
érintkezése. [Diplomatic contacts of Matthias with the Hohenzollern] Budapest 1914, 
5–6.; 9–10.
6 MKL I: nos. 191.; 192.; V. Fraknói, “Az 1472-iki zerbsti szövetség,” [The Zerbst alli-
ance] Történeti Szemle 3 (1915), 1: 115–118.
7 MKL I: nos. 195., 201.
8 MKL I: no. 196.
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against Hungary.9 The king repeated it in 1475, now with a Burgundian backing.10 
In the early 1470s Albert treated for a marriage between a son of his and Mary, 
heiress of Burgundy. The Elector, Albert IV the Wise [der Weise] of Bavaria-Mu-
nich, the archbishops of Trier and Mainz invited Matthias to a conference of the 
Electors to discuss their attitudes towards the Habsburgs.11 Saxony and Branden-
burg followed the directives of the Holy See. After his inauguration in 1472, Sixtus 
IV acknowledged Matthias’ right for Bohemia. However, as Casimir IV of Poland 
invaded Hungary in 1471 and occupied castles, Matthias’s new allies found that 
they were on the right path, Hungary being backed by the Papacy. It was also a 
point of common interest that moved Charles towards Matthias. 
Matthias had long been maintaining warm relations with the Wittelsbach, both 
the Palatinate and the Bavarian branches. In 1469 he contracted a perpetual friend-
ship and mutual military alliance against the Habsburgs and Podiebrady with 
Louis IX the Rich [der Reiche], Duke of Bavaria-Landshut and Albert IV, Duke 
of Bavaria-Munich.12 Charles the Bold was long, since 1465 allied with Frederick I 
the Victorious [der Siegreiche], Elector Palatine of the Rhine (1451–1476), acting as 
his governor in Alsace, and his cousin, Louis IX.13 Elector Frederick from 1464 on-
wards was engaged in a series of bitter quarrels with the Habsburgs, which even 
flared up into open war in 1470. The Emperor did not manage to displace Frede-
rick, who successfully fought against the emperor’s follower, Dieter von Isenburg, 
Archbishop of Mainz. From 1469 onwards Matthias was also allied with Frederick 
I, and it was partly through Wittelsbach intermediation that he tried to have Bur-
gundy involved in an anti-Habsburg alliance.14 Charles also succeeded in detach-
ing the Palatinate from the French alliance. The Palatinate Wittelsbach were old 
followers of the cause of Burgundy and England versus France: in the Hundred 
Years’ War they took part in the campaigns against France. Frederick’s father, Lou-
is III married Blanche of England, daughter of Henry IV. The successor, Philip also 
allied with Burgundy when assuming the Electoral title (1476). The Elector Pala-
tines were also Matthias’ partners in his struggle against Emperor Frederick III. 
The Bavarian dukes were the first imperial princes to acknowledge Matthias as 
King of Bohemia in 1469.15 Albert also offered to act as Matthias’ Bohemian  vicar. 
The Wittelsbach sub-branch of Otto II of Pfalz-Mosbach favoured the cause of Mat-
thias and Charles: he was also present at the wedding of Matthias and Beatrice, 
together with Christoph [der Starke], Duke of Bavaria-Munich who “sat closest 
to the Queen, on her left hand” and was knighted by the king “with St. Stephen’s 
9 MKL I: nos. 205., 214. 
10 MKL I. No. 219.
11 Á. Károlyi, „Adalék Frigyes császár és Mátyás király viszályai történetéhez,” 
[Additions to the conflicts of Matthias and Emperor Frederick] Történelmi Tár 37 
(1892), 28–31.
12 E. Kovács, Matthias, 106.
13 R. Vaughan, Philip the Bold. The Formation of the Burgundian State. London 1972. [20052] 
16.; 124. 
14 K. Nehring, Matthias Corvinus, Kaiser Friedrich III. und das Reich. Zum hunya-
disch-habsburgischen Gegensatz im Donauraum. München 1975, 68–69. 
15 W. Paravicini, Merész Károly. [Charles the Bold] Budapest 1989, 110–111; Nehring, 
Matthias, 41.
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sword”.16 He also received an annuity from the Royal Household.17 Christoph’s fa-
ther, Louis III was an old opponent of the Habsburgs since in a dispute with the 
Emperor, he invaded the imperial free cities Dinkelsbühl and Donauwörth. An-
other ally, Ulrich V, Count of Württemberg was also present at Matthias’ wed-
ding. His cousin, Henry received an annuity from Burgundy.18 Duke Charles al-
lied with several lords in the Low Countries and the Rhinelands (Dukes of Cleves, 
Geldres, Juliers-Berg).19 He also had understanding with spiritual princes like John 
of Baden-Zähringen, Archbishop of Trier (1456–1503), his brother, George, bish-
op of Metz (1459–1484) and Elector Ruprecht, Archbishop of Cologne (1463–1480), 
brother of the Palatine. The Duke chose to promote Ruprecht when he laid siege 
to Neuss in 1473. As the chapter turned against the archbishop and elected anoth-
er claimant, in 1474 he contracted a military alliance with Burgundy.20 Matthias 
also looked for spiritual elector allies. The Archbishop of Salzburg, Bernhard von 
Rohr (1466–1482) asked military help and let Styrian castles under Matthias’ con-
trol.21 The members of the mutual interest system were tied up with a number of 
marriage contacts. Albert Achilles married a Saxon duchess. William of Thuring-
ia’s sister married Frederick of Brandenburg. Louis IX of Bavaria married a Saxon 
princess. John I Duke of Cleves-Mark was a son of Mary of Burgundy, daughter of 
John the Fearless. Ulrich of Württemberg married first from the house of Cleves, 
then from Bavaria. Otto of Pfalz-Mosbach was a son of a Bavarian duchess. Ernest 
of Saxony also married from Bavaria. 
A greatest result was that in 1469 a Habsburg, Sigismund of Tyrol was de-
tached and asked Burgundian help against the Swiss.22 In return, beyond mort-
gaged lordships in Upper Alsace Charles insisted that Sigmund raise the issue of 
his election as king of the Romans, offering the hand of his daughter, Mary.23 Si-
gismund served a link towards Matthias, who also sought to have the Habsburgs 
divided, and attempted to detach Archduke Albert VI from the Emperor. Charles’ 
policies, however, against the Alsatian prompted them to turn to the Swiss. Sigis-
16 “Magyarország királya, Mátyás esküvője és a királyné koronázása (1477)?” [Matthias’ 
wedding and the Queen’s coronation] in Krónikáink magyarul, ed. P. Kulcsár, Budapest 
2006. 126–129.; Aragóniai Beatrix magyar királyné életére vonatkozó okiratok, [Documents 
for the life of Queen Beatrice] Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria XXIX, 
ed. A. Berzeviczy, Budapest 1914, no. 25.; P. E. Kovács, “Magyarország és Nápoly 
politikai kapcsolata a Mátyás-korban,” [Relations of Hungary and Naples in Mathias’ 
age] in Tanulmányok Szakály Ferenc emlékére, eds. P. Fodor, G. Pálffy, I. Gy. Tóth, 
Budapest 2002, 239; Mátyás király menyegzője 1476. A pfalzi választófejedelem követeinek 
hivatalos jelentése szerént. [Matthias’ wedding. The relation of the Palatinate envoys] ed. 
G. Kazinczy. Pest 1863, 117–137.; P. Eschenloer, “Geschichten der Stadt Breslau,” in I. 
Szamota, ed., Régi utazások Magyarországon és a Balkán-félszigeten 1054-1717, Budapest 
1891, 106.
17 4600 florins per annum. V. Fraknói, Hunyadi Mátyás király 1440-1490. [King Matthias 
Hunyadi] (Magyar Történelmi Életrajzok) Budapest 1890, [http://mek.oszk.
hu/05700/05736/ - 28 Oct 2010] 
18 Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 287.
19 Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 57.; 73.; 320.; Paravicini, Merész Károly, 107.
20 Paravicini, Merész Károly, 111.
21 MKL I: no. 193.
22 Paravicini, Merész Károly, 40.
23 Horváth, “Mátyás király nyugati diplomáciája,” 84.
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mund was bound to agree on Ewige Richtung with the Swiss confederates in 1474. 
Charles refused Sigismund to buy back his Alsace possessions. The latter united 
with the Alsace cities in the Constance “anti-Burgundian league”.24
Burgundy tried to get the support of as many opponents of Frederick III as pos-
sible to achieve his grand design, a kingdom stretching from the North Sea to the 
Mediterranean. In their overlapping alliance systems, a major basis of the common 
platform of Burgundy and Hungary was their mutual friendship with the Neapol-
itan Aragonese. From the late 1460s Matthias moved to the side of the Neapolitan 
Aragonese, which culminated in his marriage with Beatrice of Aragon in 1476. 
Both King Ferrante and his brother, John II of Aragon objected to the expansion 
of France. The titular monarchical house of Sicily, headed by René of Anjou were 
in constant antagonism with the Aragonese. In 1468 Louis XI set out to grab terri-
tories from the county of Barcelona and deployed an army. In return, Aragon and 
Naples contracted a military alliance with Burgundy in 1471.25 Charles received 
the Aragonese Order of the Ermine, and in return, in 1473 King Ferrante joined 
that of the Golden Fleece.26
The space around the Emperor was constantly narrowing by the early 1470s. It 
is not known how the two rulers came to terms regarding the issue of the Roman 
kingship, or, whether this arose at all at this early phase, when Matthias’s prime 
move was to get the crown of Bohemia and he was not yet aspiring for the Roman 
crown. Charles aimed for a sovereign monarchy but he would have first been sa–
tisfied with an independent state even without the Roman crown. When Charles 
got disappointed in Frederick after 1473, he strove to realize his scheme with oth-
er partners, the Electors and Hungary.27 Matthias, from the early 1470s sought for 
the aid of the Electors against the grievances he suffered from Frederick.28 The two 
princes moved to one another and realized their mutual concerns. Charles’ pres-
tige was increasing within the Empire and his support from the Archbishop of Co-
logne and the Palatine made him a potential opposition leader, which much fitted 
into Matthias’ schemes.29 
In 1472–1473 the Duke expected that the House of Habsburg might sacrifice 
their weak imperial power by ceding some of it or even all of it to Burgundy in re-
turn for the eventual acquisition by Maximilian of the entire complex of Burgun-
dian territories. It would have also meant that Charles obtain the crown of the Ro-
mans. Then he took it into account that he would succeed on the imperial throne 
on Frederick’s death or abdication.30 In this way the Habsburgs would be pushed 
to the Western territories of the Empire. That was the prime motive that Matthi-
24 Paravicini, Merész Károly, 127.
25 J. Calmette, „Le projet de maryge bourgignon-napolitain en 1474. D’après une 
acquisition récente de la Bibliothèque Nationale,” Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes 
lxxii (1911), 461. For the 1471 treaty of St. Omer see J. de Haynin, Mémoires de Jean, Sire 
de Haynin et de Louvignies, 1465–1477. 2 vols. ed. D. D. Brouwers, Liège 1905–1906. II. 
131.
26 Horváth, “Mátyás király nyugati diplomáciája,” 83; Paravicini, Merész Károly, 105.
27 Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 42.; Paravicini, Merész Károly, 115.
28 1472: MKL I: no. 189.
29 Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 138. 
30 Paravicini, Merész Károly, 47.
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as was also touched by. While Matthias was not acknowledged as King of Bohe-
mia, their concerns met, and Charles could hope if he would support Matthias’ 
Czech crown, the king would back him in the electoral college. Frederick was un-
willing to promote full-heartedly Charles’ dream of the kingdom of the Romans. 
Therefore he found a new ally in Matthias. Charles would not have to clash Hun-
garian interests, since Matthias at that point did not wish the Imperial throne, 
he was struggling for only one Electorate. They became partners, not enemies. 
Matthias would have been contented with the acknowledgement of his Bohemi-
an crown. The question of the Kingdom of the Romans, to which in theory both 
rulers was applying, was set aside for the moment, but they got united to oppose 
the Habsburgs. Or, Matthias might have also agreed to Charles’ crown of the Ro-
mans, and even his Imperial title, if it had meant the abdication of the Emperor at 
the same time. With Charles as elected Emperor, Matthias, acknowledged as King 
of Bohemia in the Empire, would have realized his aims and had the Habsburgs 
ousted from the Central European theatre. Matthias could have rightfully hoped 
that with the support of a new King of the Romans, or, even Emperor he would 
have modify the 1463 Habsburg inheritance treaty.31 He relied on the duke that he 
would help him in getting rid of the demands of the treaty.32
I think the viewpoint of most of the Hungarian and Central European com-
mentators of Matthias’ policy regarding the Burgundian-Habsburg marriage con-
nection may be revised.33 Karl Nehring postulated that the Burgundian-Habsburg 
inheritance treaty of 1471 seemed threatening for Matthias since it confirmed the 
position of the Emperor within the Empire and meant a loss of a potential Western 
ally.34 However, the political situation in 1471 and 1473–1474 was much different, 
and the political constellation of Burgundy and the Habsburgs was not continuous-
ly friendly on the basis of a preliminary agreement of a betrothal of Mary to Max-
imilian. Maximilian was only one of the suitors, with whom it had appeared pref-
erable to make an agreement in 1471, but he was not the most suitable in 1473. It 
was just one of the several preliminary marriage negotiations. The first time that he 
made a concrete promise to the Habsburgs was only after the battle of Grandson, 6 
May 1476, but before nothing was secure. The scheme was beneficial for Burgundy 
since it was linked to the appointment of Charles as vicar of the imperial territories 
on the left bank of the Rhine. However, by 1473 Mary and Maximilian were not yet 
engaged. Their betrothal was not the only option amongst the cards in the hands 
of the Duke. Her hand was eagerly sought by a number of princes (the future Fer-
dinand II of Aragon; George, Duke of Clarence; Philip of Wittelsbach; Nicolas of 
Lorraine).35 Charles was using his only daughter as a bait, a diplomatic weapon, in 
31 K. Nehring, “Mátyás külpolitikája,” [Matthias’ foreign policy] Történelmi Szemle 21:3–
4 (1978), 430. [= “Mátyás külpolitikája.” in Mátyás király 1458–1490, ed. G. Barta, Bu-
dapest 1990, 104–117.] 
32 Horváth, “Mátyás király nyugati diplomáciája,” 86. 
33 Nehring, Matthias, 68; K. Nehring, “Angaben zu einer unveröffentlichten Kopie eines 
Registers aus der Kanzlei von Matthias Corvinus,” Levéltári Közlemények 43 (1972), 85–96. 
34 Nehring, Mátyás, 430. 
35 Calmette, „Le projet de maryge bourgignon-napolitain,“ 462; Calendar of State 
Papers and Manuscripts in the Archives and Collections of Milan 1385-1618. I. ed. 
A. B. Hinds, London 1912. (hereafter CSP Milan), I: 67; 168.
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accordance with his momentous political considerations. The agreement with the 
Habsburgs is not to be taken seriously. Nothing showed that Maximilian would be 
the victorious. For Charles the Habsburg marriage was not an end in itself, it was 
a means to independent power. Charles’ offers were yet all insincere. He could not 
watch with his own eyes that some non-Burgundian prince take over his territories. 
He did not for a moment think to give his daughter to Maximilian, not at all in 1473, 
after the break-up of his schemes at the Trier talks.36
When Hungary and Burgundy fisrt initiated contacts, at the beginning of the 
1460s, Philip the Good was going to enter a crusade against the Ottomans organ-
ized by Pope Pius II. It already had an anti-French colour since Louis XI sought to 
make the Pope place the House of Anjou on the throne of Naples. He made it clear 
that otherwise he would back George of Podiebrady, and for years he was float-
ing the opportunity to help the Hussite king, which, however, naturally turned 
Hungary against France.37 In 1469, when Matthias invaded the kingdom, George 
turned to Louix IX for help.38 This would have put Hungary and Louis’ opponent, 
Charles the Bold onto the same platform. However, in the late 1460s Matthias and 
Burgundy had not the warmest relations since Podiebrady also sent embassies to 
the Duke.39 Pope Paul II also found it an opportunity to have the Duke of Burgun-
dy crowned King of Bohemia. Emperor Frederick III, hard pressed by Matthias, 
also thought to support this scheme.40 Duke Charles himself first promoted the 
cause of George Podiebrady, as far as the Hussite king, as Elector, seemed to be 
willing to support his ambitions to get the Crown of the Roman Kingdom, or to 
promote his concerns to form an independent Monarchy of Burgundy.41 In return, 
Charles would reconcile George with the pope.42 However, when the Duke found 
that, Podiebrady had less and less weight, moved from George’s side.43 After the 
death of Podiebrady and the successes of the Hungarians in Bohemia, he moved 
closer to Matthias and strove to realize his schemes with the help of the king of 
Hungary. Matthias was also proposing for the crown of the Romans as well as for 
Frederick’s daughter, Kunigunde in marriage, but as the Emperor refused him he 
also moved closer to the Burgundian alliance. 
It is not by chance that as Matthias’s troops again invaded Austria, and Fred-
erick asked help from the estates at the Augsburg Reichstag in 1473, Charles was 
appointed by the Pope as arbitrator of the Bohemian inheritance conflict between 
36 Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 126–128. 
37 Horváth, “Mátyás király nyugati diplomáciája,” 83; Fraknói, Hunyadi Mátyás [http://
mek.oszk.hu/05700/05736/]
38 Fraknói, Hohenzollernek, 8.
39 Fraknói, Hohernzollernek, 16.; J. K. Hoensch, Matthias Corvinus. Diplomat, Feldherr und 
Mäzen. Graz–Wien–Köln 1998, 114.
40 Hoensch, Matthias Corvinus, 99., 106.
41 J. Macek, “Corvin Mátyás és Poděbrad György,” [Matthias and Podiebrady] in Hun-
yadi Mátyás. Emlékkönyv Mátyás király halálának 500. évfordulójára, ed. Gy. Rázsó, L. v. 
Molnár, Budapest 1990, 219–220., 230. 
42 Philippe de Commines, Mémoires, ed. D. Godefroy–L. du Fresnoy, 4 vols. Paris 1747, 
III: 116–118.
43 O. Odlozilik, The Hussite King. Bohemia in European Affairs, 1440–1471. New Brunswick 
1965, 239–242.
maTThiaS corvinuS and charLeS The BoLd
75
Matthias and Poland.44 The Duke might have wished himself to obtain the position, 
we have no knowledge on that, but it is most probable that Charles hoped to get 
closer to the affairs of the eastern territories of the Empire, and desired to get allies 
in his primary scheme to be elected King of Burgundy. We may perhaps assume 
that Charles seemed to be convinced that the planned negotiations with the Emper-
or would fail, and started an anti-Habsburg campaign even be fore the negotia-
tions. 
However, on the basis of a letter of Matthias to Charles of 6 July 1471, so far 
unknown in Hungarian historiography, after the death of Podiebrady the king of 
Hungary sent an envoy to Burgundy, and asked the duke to act as a mediator in 
the Hungarian-Jagiellonian struggle for Bohemia.45 Nevertheless, the parties had 
already been in communication by the early 1470s: in 1469, when Charles was in-
stalled in Ghent as Count of Flanders he received envoys from Hungary.46 On his 
way back the envoy was showing off with the Burgundian alliance in front of the 
Elector of Brandenburg.47 Albert advised the Emperor to try to dissuade the Duke 
to act as an arbitrator in the Hungarian–Polish conflict and strengthen his bond 
with the Jagiellonians versus the rapprochement of Matthias and Charles.48 
Matthias seemed a good point of concern. If Matthias be crowned King of Bo-
hemia, with the help of Burgundy, Charles could count on his aid in return for his 
designs within the Empire. The alliances and successes of Matthias in Austria in 
1472 must have pushed Frederick III to declare that he was willing to acknowledge 
Matthias’ rights for Bohemia if he would withdraw troops from Habsburg territo-
ry. As in April 1473 the Emperor urged the princes to give assistance against the 
Hungarian invasions, Charles made benefit of the situation as he pushed himself 
forth as the saviour of the Empire, who could make peace. He also hoped to in-
crease his chances to get a sovereign monarchy, his authority was growing. The 
key towards his dream of a Burgundian kingdom seemed to be Matthias’s Bohe-
mian crown and a strong interest-circle in the eastern territories of Germany, the 
Hohenzollern, the Wettin and the Wittelsbach dynasties; centrally held together 
by Matthias from Bohemia. Matthias’ control over the eastern peripheries of the 
Empire was aided by precious alliances in Silesia, first with Konrad X, Duke of 
Öls/Oleśnica; then with John II Duke of Sagan/Żagań.
A few weeks after Matthias’s troops invaded again Austria, in May 1473 the 
duke of Burgundy received a Hungarian embassy at Valenciennes.49 The threat 
of an encircling Burgundian-Hungarian alliance had a striking impact on the Em-
peror: in June he offered a personal meeting to Duke Charles, to be held at Trier 
in August. Nevertheless, the Emperor made it unquestionable that he had no in-
tention of abdicating his imperial authority to Charles. Although Charles agreed 
44 Hoensch, Matthias Corvinus, 132., 134.
45 Bibliothéque National de France, Paris. Mélanges de Colbert 396, Nr. 688. cited by 
Nehring, Matthias, 68. 115n.; A. Ph. Segesser, Die Beziehungen der Schweizer zu Matthias 
Corvinus, in den Jahren 1476–1490. Luzern 1860, 4.
46 R. Putnam, Charles the Bold. Last Duke of Burgundy 1433–1477. New York 1908, 245.
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to have a meeting to discuss their standpoints, he started a grand scheme of get-
ting more and more allies to isolate the Habsburgs. Just before the Duke met with 
Frederick, he wished to put pressure on him with a massive list of allies. In 1473 
at Thionville he received ambassadors from Hungary, England, Denmark, Britta-
ny, Ferrara and the Palatinate.50 The kings of Hungary, England and Naples also 
sent embassies to Trier.51 The members of the would-be coalition were all present. 
Frederick still felt himself strong enough to oppose Matthias, since he hoped to get 
to an understanding with Charles, for he was wishing to finalize the scheme of the 
betrothal of Maximilian with Mary of Burgundy. That is why he rigidly refused 
all Matthias’ demands and summoned the Reichstag to call upon him to withdraw 
his troops from Austria. Formerly, in 1472, Frederick seemed to be willing to ac-
knowledge Matthias’s Bohemian crown if he would cease to support the rebels in 
Austria. Now, Frederick pronounced a much more stubborn standpoint: there was 
no word of the acknowledgement of the Bohemian crown. A few weeks before, at 
the end of June Matthias informed the Austrian estates that for the purpose of the 
acknowledgement of the Bohemian crown, he was bound to seek for other means, 
which of course meant war.
However, until the fiasco of the negotiations with Frederick at Trier the Duke 
found no reason to commit himself.52 A year after, in 1473 Matthias tried again 
to turn to him against the Emperor.53 By the next year the Duke realized that the 
Habsburgs were on the way to approach the French and the Emperor was ready 
to propose for an alliance with Louis XI.54 After the failure at Trier, Charles, com-
mitted himself in actively assisting his allies, first of all Archbishop Ruprecht of 
Cologne, if need be by force of arms. He explained in a letter to the Archbishop 
of Mainz that the Emperor “tried to persuade our subjects to rebel against us”.55 
In 1474 he resumed the contacts with Matthias and initiated negotiations.56 1474–
1475 saw several missions between Hungary and Burgundy. Charles must have 
been in need of support being tied up in three fronts from April 1474. The Upper 
Rhine provinces revolted and in a campaign against the chapter of Cologne he laid 
Neuss under siege.57 Frederick was bound to call the estates to war but most of the 
allies of Charles and Matthias flatly refused to assist him. Duke Albert of Bavar-
ia did not take an active part in the clash but kept being more or less neutral. Al-
bert of Saxony, willy-nilly, responded the call and raised a contingent, but he was 
always “on the brink of packing up”. Charles duly offered him a close alliance, 
which he accepted instead.58 During the siege, a Hungarian embassy arrived to 
Charles and in November 1474 a treaty was drawn up.59 The memoirs of Philippe 
50  Putnam, Charles the Bold, 363. 
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de Croy relate that the “[…] the king of Naples’ son” was sent “to see what is go-
ing on. The king of Hungary has sent here his ambassador”.60 Chastellain also con-
firms the presence of Matthias’ embassy at the Burgundian camp.61 In addition, a 
German source emphasizes the presence of Hungarian envoys coming to Neuss.62 
On 8 December 1474 in Breslau, in the armistice with the Jagiellonians, Matthias 
had Charles the Bold enlisted amongst his confederates. When the Neapolitan en-
voys arrived in 1475, the king also boasted with his Burgundian ally.63 
Charles’ stand against Frederick III was newly confirmed by his acts to find a 
new fiancée for his daughter, putting the 1471 agreement with Maximilian aside. 
It was partly due to efforts of the pro-Burgundian power constellation that a new 
marriage plan was proposed to the Duke, to marry Mary to Federico of Taranto, 
infant of Naples, brother of Matthias’s fiancée, in this way uniting the parties in a 
double matrimonial bond.64 The new suitor and successor of the Burgundian in-
heritance was to become Prince Federico, and not Maximilian, which was a great 
victory for Matthias. Fearing of isolation Louis XI abandoned the scheme of the 
Catalan campaign and also sought to approach Naples: in 1473 he proposed that 
one of his sons would marry Beatrice of Aragon.65 However, at the time Ferdinand 
of Naples had already been negotiating for the marriage of Beatrice with Matthias, 
and partly due to an intervention of Matthias and Duke Charles he refused France. 
The Hungarian–Neapolitan rapprochement dates back to the mid-1460s. In 
1468, partly because of the activization of the Anjou claimant in Catalan, Aragon 
and Naples wished to get Matthias involved in an anti-French alliance, under the 
leadership of Burgundy, and offered the hand of Beatrice d’Aragon.66 The talks 
were continued parallelly with the rapprochement between Hungary and Bur-
gundy.67 The approach was helped by Ferrarese mediation.68 The Este dukes had 
been nurturing deep connections with Burgundy. 
Another ground for the Hungarian–Neapolitan rapprochement was the 1470 al-
liance of the French Angevins with Venice, which, apart from its strong anti-Arag-
onese colour meant a threat towards Hungary, particularly after the conspiracy of 
Janus Pannonius, who had been in good relationship with Venice and King René.69 
As Venice also took a pro-Habsburg stand, Matthias was interested to get closer to 
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the Aragonese.70 He was to seek the friendship of the anti-Anjou and anti-French 
forces, that is, Naples and Burgundy since a French–Venetian alliance meant a con-
stant threat. Anti-Venetian motives explain the rapprochement between Matthias 
and the Duke of Milan, Gian Galeazzo Sforza. Although in 1471 Matthias made an 
effort for an alliance, it was not until 1473 that they finally came to terms.71
The Italian partners of the Neapolitan-Burgundian coalition were also interre-
lated through several dynastic links. Duke Ercole d’Este of Ferrara married Ele-
onore of Aragon, and his daughter, Isabella d’Este married another member of the 
alliance, Francesco II Gonzaga, Margrave of Mantova. The Gonzagas, especially 
Ludovico III (1444–1478) maintained good relationships with Burgundy. Federico 
I Gonzaga married from the house of Bavaria-Munich. Both the Gonzagas and the 
Estes sought to seal the alliance by sending his offsprings, Rodolfo Gonzaga and 
Francesco d’Este to the Burgundian court.72
In May 1474, parallelly with the embassies to Neuss, Matthias sent missions to 
Naples to suit for the hand of Beatrice.73 In the autumn of 1474 a double betroth-
al was announced between Matthias and Beatrice, and, Mary of Burgundy and 
Federico of Taranto. At the same time a Burgundian envoy was commissioned to 
travel to Naples and bring Prince Federico to the ducal court.74 In October 1474 
King Ferrante sent his son to the Duke, having a procuratio for the marriage.75 The 
letters speak of a deep amity between the two houses, “benivolentiae et fraternitatis 
nexus, quibus mutuo astringimur, indissolubili et perpetua firmitate et stabilitate firma-
buntur, et mutuus amor effecit”. The two marriage negotiations were being conduct-
ed parallely with the embassies between Matthias and the Duke of Burgundy. On 
18 October 1474 the prince did set out for his would-be fiancée in Burgundy. On 
20 June 1475 a preliminary marriage was contracted per procuram with Matthias in 
Naples.76 Parallelly with the Hungarian embassy, in July 1475 King Ferrante re-
ceived ambassadors from Charles. They were to go England, Portugal, Aragon as 
well as Sixtus IV to notify the members of the alliance of the marriages.77 Federico 
was staying with Charles the Bold in the following years, until 1476. As an eye-
witness account justifies, he was also at the camp at Neuss and fought in the Bur-
gundian army.78 By the end of 1474, according to the great scheme of Burgundy– 
Hungary and Naples Federico would become the grand duc d’Occident, his sister, 
Beatrice would marry the great ruler of Central Europe, and Naples and Aragon 
would be able to withstand the French attempts for territorial growths, while the 
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king of England would, conjointly with the Duke of Burgundy lay a campaign into 
France as well as into the Habsburgs’ imperial fiefs.79 It was a symbolic act that 
Duke Charles had Federico seated on his left hand when he received the homage 
of Lorraine in Nancy on 18 December 1475.80 
Matthias and Charles were acting in concord. At this time Matthias contracted 
a peace with Władisłas Jagiello (Ófalu, February 1474), but as it was in no time be-
trayed by the Poles as Władisłas entered into an alliance with Frederick two weeks 
afterwards, Matthias announced that he would launch a campaign into Silesia in 
June. For this reason he reconfirmed his alliance with the Wettins, and set out to 
the siege of Breslau.81 Frederick, fearing of isolation, begged for a personal meeting 
with Charles. Although he refused all the demands of Burgundy at Trier, needed 
to gain time. He needed the Jagiellonians again, and enticed them to betray the 
peace with Hungary a few weeks after they had signed it. 
Matthias also sought for other allies and sent an embassy to Duke Charles’ ally 
and brother-in-law, Edward IV of England in June 1474. In 1471 Edward conclud-
ed an offensive alliance with Burgundy versus Louis XI.82 From 1472 onwards 
Charles was expecting Edward to go on a campaign.83 In July 1474 a scheme of in-
vasion was set up “to recover the realm of France”.84 It was agreed that Charles 
would back Edward’s claim for the throne of France and in return, he, as King of 
France grant territories to the Duke.85 In July 1475 English troops landed in Nor-
mandy, which had a shocking influence on the European power constellation.86 To 
widen the alliance system with Burgundy’s partners in December 1474 Edward IV 
sent an embassy to the King of Hungary and proposed an alliance.87 We have no 
data on Matthias’s answer to the king, but we should assume that there was a pos-
itive reply, since Hungary was listed at the treaty between Louis XI and Edward 
IV at Picquigny in August 1475 as an ally of England and Burgundy.88 At the be-
ginning of 1474 King Ferrante reconfirmed his military alliance with Burgundy as 
well as was supplying soldiers to the Burgundian theatre of war from Italy.89 More 
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or less parallelly with the Hungarian embassy to Naples in the summer of 1474, 
Edward IV issued orders to treat with Naples.90 Edward wished to make King Fer-
rante acknowledge his rights to the French crown and support his campaign in 
Normandy. On 15 August 1475, a few days after the Hungarian envoys contracted 
the matrimonium per procuram at the Castel Nuovo, Ferrante reconfirmed his alli-
ance with Edward IV. He was also made Knight of the Garter.91
At the same time, Burgundy sought to have her old relationships revived and 
involved in her alliance system. John II of Aragon also confirmed his friendship, 
and the English-Burgundian rapprochement with Ferrara was also resumed.92 A 
Veronese chronicler noted that in September 1474 perpetual fraternity was pro-
claimed between Charles and the kings of Naples, Hungary and England. Charles 
sent a gift of a mantle of crimson velvet a la borgognona to Ercole d’Este, who also 
accepted Ferrante’s order, the “Armellino”.93 By the autumn of 1474 Hungary and 
Burgundy had been connected in a firm alliance framework.94 
The king of Hungary needed to reconfirm his alliances in the new situation. In 
the autumn of 1474 he renewed his alliance with Ernest, Elector of Saxony. On 2 
December Matthias commissioned an envoy to treat with Ernest in a secret matter, 
which may have been the support to be given to the Duke of Burgundy at the siege 
of Neuss. The Thüringisch– Erfurtische Chronik reports that in January 1475 Charles 
and Matthias agreed to partition the Empire. Charles was to conquer and keep the 
towns and bishoprics along the Rhine and become king of the Romans, while Mat-
thias was to have Breslau and Bohemia as Elector.95 In return, the Duke will guar-
antee that the Electors safeguard Hungary against any aggression from Poland. 
In May another Hungarian embassy arrived at Neuss seeking an alliance against 
Frederick and a full-scale Burgundian embassy set out for Hungary on 1 August 
1475.96 Charles needed the support of Hungary as he suffered the first defeat at the 
hands of the Swiss at Héricourt in November 1474.97 What is more, in January 1475 
the Swiss contracted an offensive alliance against Burgundy with France.98
Nevertheless, as the military situation at the siege came to a standstill, and as 
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Charles being tied up and his armies being at war from June 1474 to June 1475, 
he could not give support to the English in Normandy.99 Edward was bound to 
sign a peace with France on 29 August 1475. As a consequence, on 13 September 
Charles was also bound to contract a treaty with Louis XI at Soleuvre, and, was 
forced to agree on a peace – but not an alliance with the Emperor on 17 Novem-
ber. However, he still listed Hungary as his ally: the treaty with the Habsburgs 
did not break the alliance between Hungary and Burgundy.100 Some works state 
that in vain Matthias tried to make Burgundy his ally and involve him in the war 
against the Habsburgs since as Burgundy contracted with Frederick III in Novem-
ber 1475 in Nancy, the attempts got void, and the alliance annulled. Nehring, and 
partly Zsuzsa Teke stipulate that Matthias was not able to prevent the alliance of 
Charles with the Emperor in 1475.101 Péter E. Kovács also states that the Novem-
ber 1475 agreement between Burgundy and the Habsburgs “prevented the further 
approach between Matthias and Charles”, and thus “the king of Hungary had not 
much hope to make benefit of the situation”.102 I would not agree. Hoensch also 
speaks of an alliance with Frederick, though finds that it did not touch the alliance 
of Charles with Matthias, which was still alive even afterwards.103 It is true that 
the alliance was firmly working even after the treaty of Nancy. In October 1475 
another Hungarian embassy was to treat for a reconfirmation of the alliance with 
Charles, at this time specifically against the Emperor. The parties sent embassies to 
one another in the spring of 1476 to reconfirm the anti-Habsburg league, since, as 
Matthias wrote, Frederick enticed the Swiss against the Duke (see below the king’s 
letter of 7 May 1476). Then came as a final shock that the Swiss attacked him again 
at the end of 1475. The Duke needed Matthias’ support more than ever. 
The Burgundian–Hungarian–Neapolitan–English alliance had to have an an-
ti-Habsburg colour as well, since the partners were right to guess that France 
would seek for the help of Frederick III, or, if it had not already sought his assis-
tance even before the negotiations of Matthias and Charles. It was more than inevi-
table for Charles himself to reconfirm his alliances since a few days after the Nancy 
treaty with Burgundy the king of France, the only hope of the Habsburgs, betrayed 
the treaty with Burgundy – signed in Compiègne, in June 1474 – and allied with 
Frederick III on 31 December 1475 at Andernach.104 A united front of France and the 
Habsburgs was born – which demanded the union of Burgundy and his potential 
allies, Hungary as well. Moreover, the activization of Louis XI – recruiting Swiss-
men in October – made the king of Hungary to intervene for his own concerns as 
well.105 In addition, the flight of Johann Beckensloer, Archbishop of Esztergom to 
the Emperor enraged Matthias and gave a good reason to reopen the hostilities 
at the beginning of 1476. Charles came to the understanding that he was unable 
to fight a two-front war, unable to give military assistance to the English against 
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France and defend his “empire” and allies from Friesland to Savoy. He was in need 
of strong, powerful allies. That is why he was renewing the negotiations with Hun-
gary even in 1475. After the fiasco of Neuss Matthias was trying to get new allies 
to join the Burgundian-Neapolitan coalition. In December 1475 he sent an envoy 
to the Margrave of Mantua, Ludovico III Gonzaga.106 He wished to assure himself 
from the commitment of Milan and authorized the same envoy to treat with Duke 
Galeazzo Maria Sforza as well.107 It was a success to have Milan, a traditional French 
ally detached from the Valois bloc. On 30 January 1475 Milan allied with Burgun-
dy against France in the League of Moncalieri.108 Moreover, a few weeks later there 
was even talk of a visit of Lodovico Sforza to Charles to seal the alliance himself.109 
Matthias had long been striving to have Milan on his side, and similarly, from the 
late 1460s Charles had been negotiating to seek the possibilities for a Milanese al-
liance.110 In 1464–1465 it was an alternative that Matthias marry Duke Francesco’s 
daughter, Ippolita.111 The year 1469 saw a rapprochement: the king of Hungary 
sent an envoy to Francesco Sforza.112 Milan also found a partner in Hungary in 
his desire to prevent the Habsburg–Burgundian marriage in 1471–1473.113 The con-
tacts were eased by matrimonial ties: Ippolita Sforza married Ferrante’s son, Al-
fonso, Beatrice’s brother. Duke Galeazzo’s son, Gian Galeazzo married Isabella of 
Naples, granddaughter of Ferrante. Another daughter of Galeazzo Maria married 
Alfonso d’Este, son of Ercole I d’Este and Leonora of Naples. Matthias sent an en-
voy to Milan, and contracted a military alliance in 1473 largely against Venice.114 In 
1474–1475 an ever greater number of embassies followed on another between the 
Corvinian and the Sforza court. Almost resident ambassadors were stationed in 
both courts.115 Milan fitted into the old scheme of Burgundian diplomacy: the alli-
ances with Sigismund of Tyrol, Savoy, and Milan Burgundy could operate an axis 
between the Netherlands and Italy, and supported by Naples and its Italian part-
ners, Ferrara and Mantova it would aspire to reactivate the old Kingdom of Are-
late. As a faithful Burgundian partner, England also moved towards Milan. In 1476 
Edward sought to marry the Prince of Wales to a daughter of Duke Galeazzo. (The 
Duke’s widow had already been proposed by Milan to the Prince, at the same time 
with Matthias’s marriage negotiations.) It is partly because of the Milanese bond 
that Venice had an antagonism towards Burgundy, but the Milanese-Venetian con-
flict was also a prime factor that moved Duke Charles to a common platform with 
Hungary. Galeazzo Maria Sforza had already proposed an alliance against Venice 
and France to Hungary in 1471, but up until 1475, and the formation of a Burgundi-
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an–Hungarian axis did not renounce his pro-French standpoint. It was Matthias’s 
rapprochement with Charles that moved him out of the neutral position. Florence 
did also enter the coalition against Venice. When in 1472 Louis XI asked Lorenzo 
de Medici to mediate for the marriage between his nephew, Philibert, Duke of Sa-
voy and Eleonore, daughter of Ferrante, as well as between the dauphin, Charles 
and Beatrice of Aragon, Il Magnifico rejected it and declared that he supported the 
Burgundian side and thus prevented the French diplomacy from trying to detach 
Naples from the English-Burgundian connection. 
Matthias feared that after the success Frederick III gained in the field of diplo-
macy, the former allies of the Burgundian party would leave the coalition, that is 
why he sent another ambassador to Brandenburg, to treat with Albert Achilles. 
However, he did not succeed sine the prince changed sides and took to support 
the Habsburgs in 1474–1475. In the autumn of 1474 Matthias, mainly because of 
their disputes in the Glogau conflict also broke with Brandenburg.116 Nevertheless, 
Matthias in the early months of 1476, after the fiasco of Neuss sensed danger and 
warned Charles the Bold not to engage into a long lasting campaign against the 
Swiss. Sigimund of Tyrol changed sides and chose to support the Swiss against 
Burgundy. Louis XI realized the importance of the Swiss and in June 1474 inter-
vened for a peace between them and the Emperor.117 With the Duke of Lorraine, 
René II joining the French–Habsburg–Swiss alliance, Burgundy got dangerously 
isolated. The spring of 1476 saw a Burgundian embassy to Buda, with which the 
Duke wished to renew and reconfirm their alliance.118 In May 1476 Matthias dis-
patched an envoy to the Duke, and in his letter, as a “prophet” was able to pre-
dict Charles’ fate. He fortold the dangers: the duke was now trying to accomplish 
something quite beyond his resources.119 He felt out what the Emperor was trying 
to forge and turn the Swiss against Burgundy: the Eidgenossen having semper pre-
sidia imperii. The King expressed that he could not sufficiently wonder that how 
Charles should have been so gravely deceived by the Emperor, after having once 
been seduced by him and he let himself again be snared into “a labyrinth of loss 
and disgrace”.120 He warned the Prince: “you will have the empire against you, if 
you attack that invincible people, and you cannot win over them”.121 “We exhort 
you to pause before incurring heavier losses and greater dangers”. “You will ei-
ther never escape, or escape only with damage and shame […] you are exposed to 
the loss of your life […] and all your people will be slain”.122 Matthias also forecast 
116 Fraknói, Hohenzollernek, 23-5.
117 Segesser, Die Beziehungen der Schweizer, 69.
118 J. Teleki, Hunyadiak kora Magyarországon. 12 vols. [The age of the Hunyadis in Hungary] 
Pest 1852–1863, IV: 470–472.
119 7 May 1476. MKL, II: no. 239.; MDE II: no. 212. English translation: Putnam, Charles the 
Bold, 421.
120 „Mirari satis non possumus, quod ita notorie decepta vestra fraternitatis, tantoque cum 
damno et dedecore prius seducta, nunc quoque ad talem labyrintum trahi se permisit, ex quo 
vix aut nunquam exire posit, aut summis cum jacturis cum verecundia illi sit exeundum”.
121 „cum populo illo indomito insuperabilique bella agere conduceret, quos intellexerit forte sicut 
solet bellorum eventus esse dubius vincere posse, vinci non metueret”.
122 „Per quam et regna et bona et personam ipsam suam vestra certis periculis exposituram 
noverat [...] homines illi exterminarentur.”
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the judgment: “it will be turned into a tale how a mighty prince was overcome by 
rustics whom there would have been no honour in conquering, while to be con-
quered by them would be an eternal disgrace”.123 His warning was futile. A few 
weeks later, on 22 June 1476 the Duke suffered a crushing defeat “from the hands 
of peasants” on the battlefield of Murten. In vain did Matthias propose to give as-
sistance in making peace with the Swiss.124 
Frederick and Władisłas again contracted an alliance against Matthias in De-
cember 1476. The king of Hungary was not in the position to give support to the 
duke of Burgundy. That is why chose to confirm his alliance with the Saxon princ-
es. He also applied for the help of the Imperial princes and asked for the mediation 
of Elector Ernest.125 However, in his letter of 15 March 1476 to Pope Sixtus IV in 
which he expressed his disapproval about the schemes of Louis XI and the Emper-
or to convene a universal synod to elect a new pope against Sixtus, Matthias listed 
the Duke as his ally, principem ducem Burgundie, fratre meo carissiom ac singulari con-
federato, of whom he would not believe that he would join this scheme, based on 
the confederation of his with Matthias, nullomodo credere possum, prersertim si nostre 
mutue confederationis memor esse voluerit.126 Matthias would not accept the Venetian 
sources’ news that Burgundy chose to form a league against Sixtus with his ene-
mies, the Emperor and the king of France, instead, in the autumn of 1476 he sent 
an envoy to Burgundy to make it certain what the standpoint of Charles was. (The 
envoy, Georg von Stein might have also been on another Burgundian embassy 
before that year.)127 In addition, Matthias asked Charles to join the anti-league in 
defence of the pope, led by Naples. He was to arouse the Duke that he was not to 
trust Frederick III. He was also to invite Charles, then, the king of England for the 
wedding of Matthias to be held in December.128 The envoy was also to write to the 
Pope himself from Burgundy as soon as he could get assured about the authentici-
ty of the news, hopefully assuring the pope that the Duke was not intending to en-
ter into a league against the Holy See.129 Beyond all that, the King did also send a 
special envoy to the Holy See to inform the Pope of his negotiation in the regard.130 
Sixtus IV was important for Matthias since he was ready to defend the cause of 
Hungary against the Jagiellonians, and in March 1476 sent a legate to Hungary in 
this regard. Matthias was working hard to have the alliance operate and did his 
best to warn Duke Charles not to enter the alliance against the pope. A few weeks 
later he sent ambassadors to Florence to make the Medicis enter the coalition.131 
In the spring of 1476 Hungary and England did not at all abandon the Bur-
123 „tantum principem a rusticis superatum, quos vicisse nullus aut parvus ad modum honor, a 
quibus vinci turpe semper fuit”. 
124 Dépêches des ambassadeurs milanais, II: 126.
125 2 October 1476. MKL II: no. 242.; 15 November 1476. MKL II: no. 245.
126 MKL I: no. 233.
127 V. Fraknói, Magyarország egyházi és politikai összeköttetései a római Szent-Székkel. 
[Hungary’s relations to the Holy See] 3 vols. Budapest 1901, I: 154.
128 Scriptores rerum Silesicarum. Schlesischer Geschichtsschreiber. hrsg. v. G. A. Stenzel, 
17 vols. Breslau 1835–1902, XIII: 179. 
129 Scriptores rerum Silesicarum, XIV: 8. 
130 Fraknói, Magyarország, 154. 
131 MKL I: no. 236.
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gundian alliance. Galeazzo Maria Sforza did not forsake the Burgundian alliance 
either – yet it was a tragic news for the coalition that he was killed at Christmas 
1476.132 Milan was also notified of the efforts of Matthias to save the Burgundian 
alliance as his envoy reported of the king’s letters to the Duke.133 England also sent 
a new envoy to Milanese in October 1475.134 King Ferrante also had an envoy dis-
patched to Burgundy and England.135 Matthias was working to keep the alliance 
system alive.136 The Milanese ambassador in Buda several times reported of the 
schemes of Corvinus to invite the Duke of Burgundy to his wedding.137 He also 
found it important to inform the Duke of Milan that the Neapolitan ambassador 
was to be commissioned to go to Burgundy, as a joint-Neapolitan–Hungarian en-
voy and have discussions with Duke Charles. At the time, in mid-May 1476 Mat-
thias had not yet been informed of the defeat of the Duke at Grandson. Charles 
also made all effort to keep the alliance alive: he tried hard to make peace with Si-
gismund of Tyrol, and when he succeeded in an agreement in January 1476 he still 
had Hungary listed amongst his allies.138
Matthias still felt responsible for his ally, and did not wish him to perish at the 
hands of Swiss mercenaries. Nevertheless, even as he had learnt of the Prince’s 
fiasco, on 10 June 1476, he made an attempt to save time for Burgundy and bring 
forward peace between Charles and the Swiss: in a letter written to the Eidgenos-
senschaft he offered his help and sent a mediator.139 This letter might have been 
dispatched by the Neapolitan ambassador, the Archbishop of Bari, and the for-
mer report of the Milanese envoy refers to his mission to Burgundy in June 1476. 
However, we have no further knowledge of this embassy. Even amidst the prepa-
rations for the siege of Szabács in 1476 Matthias was planning to send the joint 
Neapolitan–Hungarian envoy, the Archbishop of Bari with letters to the Duke of 
Burgundy. On the basis of the report of the Milanese ambassador, the archbishop 
– who was staying in Hungary from late autumn 1476140 – was waiting to be able 
to report the capture of the Bosnian stronghold and he was going to leave “subi-
to”, immediately for Burgundy on 20 February 1477. The wording refers to the de-
lay in the despatch of the ambassador, who was going to be charged to travel to 
132 E. Kovács, Corvin János, 962.
133 Dépêches des ambassadeurs milanais, II: 202–203.
134 CSP Milan, 217.
135 CSP Milan, 221.
136 Paravicini, Merész Károly, 122.
137 „Ultra le potenzie d’Italia, che sono invitate alle noze et cosi l’Imperatore et tutti Duca, 
Conti e Baroni de Alemagna e invitato ancora el Duca de Borgogna”: 19 May 1476: 
MDE II: no. 114.
138 Horváth, “Mátyás király nyugati diplomáciája,” 87.
139 „So hoffen wir durch erber zimlich wege di sachen zwischen eu zu früntlichen vrtage 
zu bringen; und getrauen, zwieveln auch nicht daran, ir werdet uns solchen gütlichen 
handel nit abslaen, und eu in solchen sweren leufften und anligen der Cristenheit als 
frumen cristen lewten in sulchen geschwinden lewffen der ganzen Cristenheit wol 
gepüret, auffrechtlich hallten und zimlich wege nicht verschlachen. Das wollen wir 
gen eu und den ewrn, wo esz u schulden kumpt, gnedlich erkennen”: 10 June 1476: 
MKL I: no. 240. 




the Duke as early as December 1476, but his commission was several times can-
celled for some reasons, probably because of the December 1476 Ottoman cam-
paign into Transylvania.141 The King must have had no knowledge of the death 
of the Duke at Nancy, that is why he was going to assure him that after the cam-
paign in Bosnia he was now free to turn to the affairs in the West and mediate for 
the concerns of Burgundy. 
The battles of Grandson and Murten, however, changed everything in the po-
litical constellation. The Emperor was again ready to turn against Matthias with 
Władisłas Jagiello in December 1476. Under the minority of the new duke, Gian 
Galeazzo, Milan approached Louis XI again, and Charles was on the way of to-
tal isolation. A way out was a treaty with the Habsburgs: on 6 May 1476 Charles 
agreed on the betrothal of Mary and Maximilian.142 After the defeat of Murten in 
June 1476 Charles seemed to withdraw from his alliances and lived only for war-
fare, though Edward IV and Matthias decided to keep their commitments.
A most interesting evidence is Matthias’ letter of 30 May 1477.143 It shows that 
at the time the king could have had no idea of the death of Charles the Bold, since 
he was speaking of his alliance which “he was about to conclude with his brother”, 
the Duke. He wrote this letter to the Eidgenossenschaft, proving that he had not 
had an alliance against the king of France, with whom the Swiss were allied. He 
says that he sent the envoy to the Duke of Burgundy, that is, he must be alive for the 
time being! It must have been known by the end of May in Hungary that the Duke 
had died months before in January, which means that the dating of the letter is 
dubious, it should have been issued before that date, earlier, perhaps the previous 
year. It says “an Freitag vor dem sunbtag Trinitatis”, and “in the 20th year of our 
rule”, that is, seemingly, there is no problem with this. However, we learn that the 
envoy Matthias sent to the Duke, Georg von Stein, was at that time staying at the 
court of Burgundy, and the alliance was being firm with Burgundy. It fits into the 
context of the year of 1476, since during that year Matthias was seeking for sup-
port in aid of Burgundy, throughout the Empire from the Nuremberg Reichstag 
and William of Thuringia to Ernest of Saxony (November 1476) against Freder-
ick III and Władisłas Jagiello, since the latter invaded Glogau and broke the truce. 
That is why he would have also needed reciprocally the support of Burgundy in 
1476, and still at the beginning of 1477, thus, the embassy of Stein should be put to 
late 1476 or early 1477. I am on the opinion that the copy in the Luzern Archives 
might have been misdated and the letter is to be dated to the autumn of 1476, to 
the mission of Stein, to Burgundy and his letter to Pope Sixtus IV. As it says that 
the Hungarian envoy was staying at the court of Burgundy, and the alliance was 
being firm, it fits into the year 1476. 
141 „Lo Archivesvovo de Barri Oratore a Buda della Mastra del Re da Napoli ha havuto 
lettere de partirse de li e subito andare dal Duca de Borgogna, havuto chl abbia la 
licentia el Re de Hungaria, quale credo havere fra 20-di se parte, et va in Borgogna.” 
MDE II: no. 239. 
142 Paravicini, Merész Károly, 122.
143 „[…] sunder so senndten wir den edeln unsern lieben getrewen Jörgen von Stein 
unsern ratt vordem zu unsern bruder dem herzog von Burgund nit wider den 
gannanten künig [France] noch ew.” 30 May 1477. MKL I: no. 250.
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In certain periods Matthias’s diplomatic interests were not restricted to Central 
Europe but the king was able to look further than Austria and Bohemia and run 
a leading role in the theatre of the European „grand policie”. In the context of the 
overlapping Burgundian–Neapolitan–Hungarian interest circles Prince Federico 
was going to become the grand duc d’Occident, his sister, Beatrice was to marry the 
great ruler of Central Europe. Naples would be able to withstand France, while 
England and Burgundy lay a campaign into France and the Habsburgs’ fiefs. Ac-
cording to the interpretation of Karl Nehring, Charles “was not convinced that 
an alliance with Matthias would work at all”.144 As opposed to a number of at-
tempts from Hungary to have him involved in a league, Charles gave no posi-
tive answer through 1474. Professor Nehring found that the Hungarian diploma-
cy overestimated its own role and political authority in Europe, since it expected 
that the influence of Matthias over Duke Charles would result in the failure of 
the proposed marriage negotiations between Frederick III and Burgundy. Nehring 
finds, Charles was even thinking in terms of a Habsburg-league, together with the 
Elector of Brandenburg and Poland against Matthias. I think that it is also to be 
revised on the basis of documents from the Burgundian and English diplomat-
ic machinery. Charles did not contract an alliance on 17 November 1475 with the 
Habsburgs, but a peace. He did not abandon the Hungarian, English and Arag-
onese alliances of his, on the contrary, he trusted and wished to rely on them even 
afterwards. The Duke, perhaps even before the Trier meeting, but undoubtedly af-
ter it, was full-heartedly convinced of the positive effects of a Hungarian alliance 
and did himself support a league with Naples, Aragon, Hungary and England. 
Had he not been committed to the cause of an anti-Habsburg and anti-Valois con-
federation, he would not have included his ally, Edward IV of England in the coa-
lition and would not have strive to make contacts between England and Hungary 
as well as England and his allies, Naples and Aragon.
144 Nehring, Matthias, 68–69.
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